

Research Article

Effectiveness of Labor Inspection Post Job Creation Law in Temanggung Regency

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Abstract. This study aims to analyze the effectiveness of labor supervision under the Job Creation Act No. 6 of 2023 in Temanggung Regency, focusing on supervision resources, policy communication, and labor law culture. The study uses a mixed-methods approach with an explanatory sequential design, combining a questionnaire survey of 60 respondents with in-depth interviews with 10 key informants. Quantitative analysis uses descriptive statistics and Pearson Product-Moment correlation, while qualitative data are analyzed using the Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña interactive model. The results show that labor supervision effectiveness is in the low category (mean = 2.37). Supervision resources have a strong positive correlation with supervision effectiveness ($r = 0.672$; sig. 0.000), followed by labor law culture ($r = 0.638$; sig. 0.000), and policy communication ($r = 0.584$; sig. 0.000). Centralization of supervision authority to the provincial level post-Job Creation Act has created an authority vacuum at the regency level, weakening inspection reach, wage compliance, and participation in social security. This study recommends strengthening supervisors' capacity, revitalizing vertical communication mechanisms between provinces and regencies, and implementing a community-based legal awareness development program as an integrated intervention strategy.

Keywords: Effectiveness of Labor Supervision; Job Creation Act; Legal Culture; Policy Communication; Supervision Resources.

1. Introduction

Accelerating digital transformation and Industry 4.0 dynamics have fundamentally changed the employment order worldwide. The International Labour Organization (ILO) emphasizes in its report that rapid technological changes push countries to revise labor regulations to balance market flexibility with workers' rights protection (ILO, 2019). This global trend of deregulation places the supervision function as a critical pillar to ensure that regulatory reforms do not sacrifice workers' normative rights, especially in the micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) sector, which dominates the economies of developing countries (Fenwick et al., 2020).

At the national level, Indonesia responds to this global trend by enacting Law No. 6 of 2023, which implements the Government Substitute Law No. 2 of 2022 on Job Creation (hereinafter, the Job Creation Act). This regulation brings significant changes to the national labor supervision architecture, including centralization of labor supervision powers from regency/city governments to the provincial level. According to Rusli (2021), this delegation of authority has implications for reduced supervisory reach at the local level, especially for areas with economic characteristics dominated by the informal sector. Data from the Indonesian Ministry of Manpower shows that the ratio of labor inspectors to the number of companies nationwide is still far from ideal, namely 1:1,500 companies, while the ILO standard recommends 1:40 workers in the sector (Ministry of Manpower RI, 2022). This condition affects the state's capacity to consistently enforce labor norms, especially in the MSME sector, where

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compliance levels are lower than those of large-scale companies (Wijayanti, 2018). Conceptually, the effectiveness of labor supervision can be analyzed through the framework of the Legal System Theory proposed by Friedman (1975), which breaks down the effectiveness of law into three elements: substance (legal substance), structure (legal structure), and legal culture (legal culture). This theory is often combined with Edward III's (1980) policy implementation model, which emphasizes the roles of communication, resources, the implementor's disposition, and bureaucratic structure in the success of a public policy. Several previous studies have examined the impact of the Job Creation Law from normative-constitutional perspectives; for example, Simanjuntak and Saragih (2021), who criticized the reduction of worker protection standards, and Huda and Muntoha (2022), who analyzed the implications of centralized supervision on regional autonomy. However, field-based empirical studies that integrate worker perceptions, entrepreneurs, and supervising officials in a contextualized district-level framework remain very limited.

Literature gaps are most striking in the absence of studies that simultaneously measure the effectiveness of supervision from the outputs side (wage compliance, social security participation, inspection frequency) and the socio-cultural factors that influence it. Existing studies tend to stop at regulatory document analysis, without touching the realities of implementation in the field. Moreover, the specific impact of centralized authority on districts with informal economies has never been systematically studied using a mixed-methods approach. This research gap is the scientific void this study fills.

Temanggung Regency represents a relevant and distinctive context. The regional economy is dominated by the informal sector and MSMEs, including the wood processing industry and small home industries, which historically have low labor compliance levels. Violations of working norms are still documented in various forms: wage payments below the Regency Minimum Wage (UMK), low participation in BPJS Ketenagakerjaan, non-compliance with working hours, and weak implementation of Occupational Safety and Health (K3). On the other hand, the number of labor inspectors in this area is not proportional to the area and the number of business units that must be supervised, while after the Job Creation Law, supervisory authority has shifted to the provincial level, creating a vacuum of authority at the district level (Pratiwi & Kurniawan, 2023).

This study uses a mixed-methods approach, combining quantitative questionnaire analysis with in-depth qualitative interviews. The novelty of this study lies in its integration of juridical-normative and field-empirical data that measure the effectiveness of supervision multidimensionally, including employer compliance, worker perceptions, and institutional capacity, within a single analytical framework centered on the real conditions of Temanggung Regency post-Job Creation Law implementation. The study's findings are expected to contribute to the development of a more adaptive, preventive, and equitable model of labor supervision policy.

Based on the background and the identification of the research gaps above, the main research question that becomes the focus of this study is formulated as follows: How effective is labor supervision after the Job Creation Law in Temanggung Regency, viewed from aspects of wage compliance, social security participation, inspection reach, as well as structural and sociocultural factors that influence it?

2. Literature Review

Legal Effectiveness

The effectiveness of law refers to the extent to which applicable legal norms change societal behavior in accordance with the objectives set by the regulatory authority. The substance of law is the totality of rules, norms, and patterns of behavior produced by the legal system, including laws, government regulations, and court decisions. The legal structure includes the institutions and bodies that carry out enforcement functions, such as supervisory bodies, police, and judicial institutions. Meanwhile, the legal culture represents society's attitudes, values, and beliefs toward the law, influencing how far individuals and institutions comply with the rules (Friedman, 2009).

In the context of labor supervision after the Job Creation Law, the three elements interact dynamically. Law Number 6 of 2023 explicitly sets labor norms. However, its effectiveness depends heavily on the structural capacity of labor inspectors and on the level of compliance with the legal culture of business actors and workers at the local level (Fuady, 2018). Previous research shows that weakness in any one element can disrupt the overall system's performance, so worker legal protection cannot be optimally realized even though the regulatory

framework has been designed accordingly (Soekanto & Mamudji, 2019). The relevance of this theory to research in Temanggung Regency lies in the reality that, although the substance of labor law has been updated, there is strong evidence that the structure and local legal culture have not yet supported its effective implementation.

Policy Implementation

Policy implementation is a critical stage in the public policy cycle that determines whether a regulation actually produces the intended changes in the field. George C. Edward III argued that the success of policy implementation is influenced by four main variables that operate simultaneously and interact with one another: communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure (Edward III, 1980). Communication concerns clarity, consistency, and dissemination of policy information to all actors involved in its implementation. Resources include competent personnel, adequate budgets, and supporting facilities and infrastructure. Disposition relates to the commitment and mental attitude of the implementing officials in carrying out the policy. At the same time, bureaucratic structure concerns coordination mechanisms, standard operating procedures, and the distribution of authority among institutions (Purwanto & Sulistyastuti, 2017).

This theory has been widely used in studies of labor policy implementation in Indonesia. Surjadi and Wibowo (2021) found that limitations in human resources and budgets are major obstacles in implementing labor supervision at the regional level. In line with this, Agustino (2020) emphasizes that changes in bureaucratic structure not accompanied by increased institutional capacity tend to create coordination barriers that reduce the effectiveness of public service. In the post-Job Creation Law context, centralizing supervisory authority at the provincial level raises complex structural issues. The district government loses direct authority over the supervision function, while provincial capacity to reach across the entire companies in remote areas such as Temanggung Regency has not been strengthened proportionally. This condition provides concrete evidence that structural reform without strengthening resources and communication mechanisms across levels of government can weaken, rather than strengthen, the effectiveness of implementing employment supervision policy at the local level (Nugroho, 2018).

Supervision

Supervision in public management is a systematic process that ensures an activity proceeds in accordance with the standards, plans, and objectives set beforehand. George R. Terry defined supervision as the effort to determine performance standards, measure actual results, compare them with applicable standards, and take corrective action if deviations are found (Terry & Rue, 2010). In the field of labor, the oversight function encompasses two complementary dimensions: preventive and repressive. The preventive function is realized through coaching activities, regulatory socialization, and periodic inspections aimed at preventing violations of work norms. The repressive function is carried out through actions against violations, ranging from warnings and inspection notes to investigations and criminal labor prosecutions (Manulang, 2019).

Hasibuan (2020) argues that effective labor supervision requires a balance between preventive and repressive approaches. If supervision is only reactive to reports and complaints, systemic and hidden violations will continue to go undetected. In the context of SMEs in the region, this imbalance is worsened by the limited number of inspectors, the broad coverage area, and the minimal operational budget for field inspections. Hidayat and Setiawan (2022) found that in areas with informal SME dominance, the effectiveness of labor supervision depends heavily on inspectors' ability to adopt persuasive and educational approaches, rather than solely on punitive enforcement. This finding is relevant to Temanggung Regency, where informal, close-knit work relationships require adaptive supervisory strategies that align with local culture without compromising normative worker protection standards set by applicable labor regulations.

Industrial Relations

Industrial relations is a complex system of interactions among three main actors: workers and their union organizations, employers, and the government, within an economic, social, and political environment that shapes applicable labor rules. John T. Dunlop, in his theoretical framework, views industrial relations as a system that yields a web of rules, i.e., a set of provisions governing the rights and obligations of each actor in the production process (Dunlop, 1958); cited in (Heery & Noon, 2017).

This theory has undergone significant development in the context of post-labor reform in various developing countries. Kaufman (2021) argues that the quality of industrial relations

depends on how well the balance of power among the three actors is maintained. When one party dominates, industrial relations tend to be disharmonious and give rise to various forms of violations of work norms.

In the Indonesian context, the Job Creation Law is considered by several groups to shift the balance toward employers' interests through broader labor market flexibility (Tjandraningsih, 2022). This condition weakens workers' bargaining position, especially those who work in the MSME sector without adequate labor union protection. Warouw's research (2020) shows that in areas with high levels of job informality, industrial relations are more governed by social norms and local culture than by formal legal provisions. In Temanggung Regency, this phenomenon manifests in a family-like work culture that, on the one hand, creates harmonious work relations but, on the other hand, suppresses workers' courage to demand their normative rights. This situation becomes a cultural barrier that indirectly weakens the function of labor supervision due to the lack of official complaints from workers as one of the main sources of information for supervisory officers (Bachtiar et al., 2019).

3. Research Method

This research uses a quantitative approach. This study involves four operationalized variables: First, Supervision Resources, measured by indicators: (1) the number and ratio of labor inspectors to business units; (2) technical competence and inspector certification; (3) availability of operational inspection budgets; and (4) completeness of field inspection facilities and infrastructure (Surjadi & Wibowo, 2021). Second, Policy Communication, measured by indicators: (1) clarity in conveying labor regulations to employers and workers; (2) consistency in the socialization of work norms, after the Job Creation Law; (3) accessibility of policy information for MSME business actors; and (4) effectiveness of communication channels between provincial and district governments (Edward III, 1980).

Third, Labor Law Culture, measured by indicators: (1) the level of employers' legal awareness of normative obligations; (2) workers' courage in submitting complaints of violations; (3) trust of labor actors in the legal system; and (4) internalization of compliance values in daily work relationship practices (Friedman, 2009). Fourth, Effectiveness of Labor Supervision, measured by indicators: (1) the level of compliance with wage payments according to the minimum wage; (2) percentage of BPJS Employment participation in the MSME sector; (3) frequency and coverage of field inspections; and (4) the rate of resolution of work norm violation cases (Hasibuan, 2020; Kemnaker RI, 2022).

Quantitative data collection was carried out through a structured questionnaire survey of 60 respondents, determined using a purposive sampling technique, covering workers in the MSME sector and processing industry in Temanggung Regency. The research instrument was measured using a five-point Likert Scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) and has passed validity testing using Pearson's Product-Moment correlation and reliability testing using Cronbach's Alpha, with a threshold of ≥ 0.60 (Sugiyono, 2019).

Data analysis was carried out descriptively to describe the frequency distributions and central tendencies of each variable, and inferentially using Pearson's Product-Moment correlation analysis to measure the strength and direction of the relationships between each independent variable and the dependent variable. The resulting correlation coefficient (r) is interpreted according to Guilford's guidelines: 0.00–0.19 (very weak), 0.20–0.39 (weak), 0.40–0.59 (moderate), 0.60–0.79 (strong), and 0.80–1.00 (very strong). Significance testing was conducted at the 95% confidence level ($\alpha = 0.05$) using SPSS version 26.

4. Results and Discussion

This section presents the results of data processing from 60 respondents who participated in the research survey on the effectiveness of labor supervision after the Job Creation Law in Temanggung Regency. Data collection was carried out from March to April 2024 using a structured questionnaire that met the instrument's validity and reliability requirements. The validity test results showed that all statement items have a calculated r value $> r$ table (0.254) at a 5% significance level, while the reliability test produced a Cronbach's Alpha coefficient ranging from 0.761 to 0.834 for the four variables, which means all instruments are declared reliable and suitable for use as measurement tools.

The presentation of this research result is divided into two main parts. First, descriptive analysis that describes the actual condition of each variable based on the average (mean) value per indicator) or along with its interpretation category. Second, Pearson Product-Moment cor-

relation analysis, which measures the strength and direction of the relationships among supervisory resources, policy communication, and labor law culture and the effectiveness of labor supervision. The categorization of mean values follows the five-point Likert Scale interpretation guidelines: 1.00–1.80 (Very Low), 1.81–2.60 (Low), 2.61–3.40 (Fair/Moderate), 3.41–4.20 (High), and 4.21–5.00 (Very High).

Descriptive Analysis

Supervisory Resources Variable

Table 1. Description of Supervisory Resources Variable.

No	Indicator	Mean	Category
1	Number and ratio of labor inspectors to business units	2.12	Low
2	Technical competence and inspector certification	3.08	Moderate
3	Availability of operational inspection budget	2.38	Low
4	Completeness of field inspection facilities and infrastructure	2.65	Moderate

Source: Processed primary data, 2026.

The descriptive analysis in Table 1 shows that the supervisory resources variable, as a whole, falls into the Low category, with an average value of 2.56. The indicator that received the lowest rating is the number and ratio of labor inspectors to business units (mean = 2.12), reflecting the factual condition where the number of inspectors assigned to cover Temanggung Regency from the Central Java Provincial Manpower Office is highly disproportionate compared to the thousands of business units that must be supervised. This condition aligns with data from the Indonesian Ministry of Manpower (2022), which reports a national inspector-to-company ratio of 1:1,500, far from the ILO's ideal standard. The availability of operational inspection budget is also rated low (mean = 2.38), which directly limits the frequency of field visits to remote areas in Temanggung Regency. Meanwhile, the technical competence of inspectors (mean = 3.08) and the completeness of facilities and infrastructure (mean = 2.65) are in the moderate category, indicating that although the individual qualifications of inspectors are quite adequate, limitations in quantity and budget remain the main bottlenecks hindering the effectiveness of supervision at the field level.

Policy Communication Variable

Table 2. Description of Policy Communication Variable.

No	Indicator	Mean	Category
1	Clarity of the delivery of labor regulations to employers and workers	2.83	Moderate
2	Consistency of socialization of work norms after the Job Creation Law	2.61	Moderate
3	Accessibility of policy information for MSME business actors	2.72	Moderate
4	Effectiveness of communication channels between provincial and district governments	2.47	Low
	Average of Variable X ₂	2.66	Moderate

Source: Processed primary data, 2024.

Interpretation: The policy communication variable as a whole falls into the Moderate category with an average value of 2.66. Nevertheless, most indicators are at the lower end of the medium category, so policy communication quality cannot yet be considered adequate. The indicator with the lowest value is the effectiveness of the communication channel between provincial and district governments (mean = 2.47, Low category), indicating significant coordination barriers following the centralization of supervisory authority to the provincial level.

The implication of this condition is the disruption of the flow of policy information from the provincial level to labor actors at the district level, especially UMKM actors who have limited access to formal information channels. The clarity of regulatory delivery scores highest in this variable (mean = 2.83). However, the figure still falls within a range, indicating

that entrepreneurs' and workers' understanding of the Substance of the Job Creation Law is not optimal. The inconsistency of socialization, with a mean of only 2.61, reinforces the finding that the dissemination of labor regulations in Temanggung Regency occurs sporadically and is not systematically planned.

Labor Law Culture Variable

Table 3. Description of the Labor Law Culture Variable.

No	Indicator	Mean	Category
1	Level of business owners' awareness of normative obligations	2,45	Low
2	The workers' courage to file violation complaints	2,18	Low
3	Trust of labor actors in the legal system	2,53	Medium
4	Internalization of compliance values in employment practices	2,67	Low
	Average of Variable X ₃	2,46	Medium

Interpretation: The labor law culture variable obtains the lowest average among the three independent variables, namely 2.46 in the Low category. This finding reflects the socio-cultural reality in Temanggung Regency, where informal work relationships based on trust and personal closeness predominate, leading labor actors to internalize formal legal norms to a lesser extent. The most concerning indicator is workers' willingness to file violations (mean = 2.18), which confirms Bachtiar et al.'s (2019) argument that a family-like culture in employment relations in the UMKM sector creates social pressure that deters workers from formally asserting their rights. Entrepreneurs' low legal awareness (mean = 2.45) and low trust in the legal system (mean = 2.53) form a vicious circle: entrepreneurs do not feel obliged to comply with workplace norms, while workers do not trust that the legal system will protect them if they report violations. The only indicator in the medium category is the internalization of compliance values in employment practices (mean = 2.67), indicating that a small proportion of business actors are beginning to recognize the importance of normative compliance. However, it is not yet consistently realized.

Labor Supervision Effectiveness Variable

Table 4. Description of the Labor Supervision Effectiveness Variable.

No	Indicator	Mean	Category
1	Level of compliance with paying wages according to UMK	2.48	Low
2	BPJS Ketenagakerjaan participation rate in the sector UMKM	2.33	Low
3	Frequency and scope of field inspections	2.25	Low
4	Free resolution of cases of work norm violations	2.42	Low
	Average of Variable Y	2.37	Low

Source: Processed primary data, 2024.

The variable for labor inspection effectiveness overall falls into the Low category, with an average score of 2.37, the lowest among all variables studied. All four indicators consistently fall into the low category, indicating that the failure of labor inspection in Temanggung Regency is multidimensional and not centered on just one aspect. The frequency and coverage of field inspections received the lowest score (mean = 2.25), indicating that the physical presence of inspectors in the field is rarely felt by MSME business actors, especially in areas far from the city center. The low participation in BPJS Employment (mean = 2.33) reflects the weak enforcement of social security obligations in the MSME sector. At the same time, the case-resolution rate for violations, at only 2.42, indicates that the follow-up mechanism has not been effective. Overall, this condition confirms that the centralization of inspection authority to the provincial level after the Job Creation Law has created a vacuum of authority at the regency level, resulting in a real weakening of normative worker protection in Temanggung Regency.

Correlation Analysis

Table 5. Results of Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Analysis.

Variable Relationship	r Calculated	r Table (n=60, $\alpha=0.05$)	Sig. (2-tailed)	Direction	Note
X ₁ → Y (Supervisory)	0.672	0.254	0.000	Strong	Significant

Resources on Effectiveness of Supervision)				Positive
X ₂ → Y (Policy Communication on Effectiveness of Supervision)	0.584	0.254	0.000	Moderate Significant Positive
X ₃ → Y (Labor Law Culture on Effectiveness of Supervision)	0.638	0.254	0.000	Strong Significant Positive

Source: Primary data processed using SPSS v.26, 2024.

The relationship between Supervisory Resources and Labor Inspection Effectiveness. The analysis results show a correlation coefficient of $r = 0.672$ (p -value < 0.05), indicating that H_0 is rejected and that there is a strong, significant positive relationship between supervisory resources and labor inspection effectiveness in Temanggung Regency. The calculated r value (0.672) is greater than the r table value (0.254), strengthening this conclusion. The positive direction of the relationship means that the more adequate the supervisory resources, including the number of inspectors, competence, budget, and facilities, the higher the effectiveness of labor inspection can be. This finding aligns with the research of Surjadi and Wibowo (2021), which emphasizes that limitations in human resources and budget are the main structural obstacles to the implementation of labor inspection functions in the regions. In the context of Temanggung Regency, the low condition of supervisory resources (mean = 2.56), which is strongly correlated with the low effectiveness of inspection (mean = 2.37), indicates that strengthening inspector capacity, both in quantity and operational support, is the most urgent intervention priority.

The relationship between Policy Communication and Labor Inspection Effectiveness. The obtained correlation coefficient is $r = 0.584$, with a significance value of $0.000 < 0.05$, indicating a moderate and significant positive relationship between policy communication and labor inspection effectiveness. Although the relationship is in the moderate category, this correlation remains statistically and substantively meaningful. The interpretation of this finding is that the clarity, consistency, and accessibility of information regarding labor regulations contribute significantly to increased compliance among employers and workers, which, in turn, supports overall effectiveness in supervision. The main obstacle identified is the weak vertical communication channel between provincial and district governments (mean indicator = 2.47), a direct consequence of the centralization of supervisory authority following the Job Creation Act. This condition strengthens Edward III's (1980) argument that communication failures in policy implementation can hinder the success of regulatory reform, even when the law's substance has been well designed.

Relationship between the Labor Law Culture and the Effectiveness of Labor Inspection. The correlation coefficient $r = 0.638$ ($p < 0.05$) indicates a strong, significant positive relationship between labor law culture and supervision effectiveness. This finding has important implications because the culture of law variable has the lowest mean (2.46) yet correlates strongly with the dependent variable. This means that entrepreneurs' low legal awareness, workers' lack of courage to report, and weak trust in the legal system collectively constitute a cultural barrier that is highly determinative of labor supervision's low effectiveness.

These results confirm Friedman's (2009) theory that the rule-of-law culture is the most determinative element in the legal system, because without internalizing the value of compliance, even a good regulatory framework will not yield the expected behavioral changes. This finding also reinforces Warouw's (2020) argument that in regions with a dominance of informal work relationships, social norms and local culture have more influence on labor behavior than formal legal provisions. Therefore, a punitive-only supervisory approach will not be effective without accompanying strategies to build legal awareness systematically and sustainably.

5. Discussion

This study's findings consistently show that the effectiveness of labor inspection in Temanggung Regency after the implementation of the Job Creation Act is at a worrying level.

The four dependent variable indicators, namely wage compliance, participation in the Employment Social Security Agency (BPJS Ketenagakerjaan), inspection frequency, and resolution of violations, are all categorized as low with an aggregate mean of 2.37. This condition is not merely an administrative technical issue; it reflects systemic failures rooted in three layers of problems: structural, communicative, and cultural, which reinforce each other in forming a vulnerable labor ecosystem.

Resource Deficit as the Structural Root of Supervisory Failure

The strongest correlation found in this study is between supervisory resources and supervisory effectiveness ($r = 0.672$), confirming that institutional capacity constraints are a primary determinant of supervisory function failure. The very disproportionate supervisor-to-enterprise ratio in Temanggung Regency reflects a national condition long highlighted: 1:1,500 companies, far from the ILO standard of 1:40 workers in high-risk sectors (Kemnaker RI, 2022). Centralization of supervisory authority to the Central Java Provincial Labor Office, as mandated by the Job Creation Act, is not accompanied by additional personnel or a proportional strengthening of supervisory infrastructure, thereby widening the gap between supervisors and the entities they supervise (Pratiwi & Kurniawan, 2023). Agustino (2020) warns that structural reform not accompanied by capacity strengthening will not only fail to improve effectiveness but may create conditions worse than before. This study's findings prove that warning. Empirically, rather than strengthening supervision, centralization creates an authority vacuum at the district level, which has long been the spearhead of field supervision.

Policy Communication Cut Off in the Middle of the Road

A moderate yet significant relationship between policy communication and supervision effectiveness ($r = 0.584$) reveals serious problems in the chain of delivering labor regulations. The lowest indicator in this variable is the effectiveness of the communication channel between provincial and district governments (mean = 2.47), indicating that institutional fragmentation due to centralization has disrupted the coordination network that had organically developed at the local level. Edward III (1980) argues that the success of policy implementation heavily depends on the clarity and consistency of information transmission to all implementers at various bureaucratic levels. When this channel is blocked, MSME actors with limited access to formal information become the most disadvantaged because they do not understand the normative obligations that actually apply. This condition is exacerbated by the fact that the socialization of the Job Creation Law at the district level is sporadic and unstructured, so significant substantive regulatory changes are not conveyed evenly to entrepreneurs and workers (Huda & Muntoha, 2022).

Legal Culture as the Most Persistent Cultural Barrier

The most substantive yet most complex finding in this study is the strong correlation between labor law culture and supervision effectiveness ($r = 0.638$), with this variable having the lowest mean value among all variables (mean = 2.46). The low level of workers' willingness to report (mean = 2.18) reflects a phenomenon described by Warouw (2020) as normative silence, i.e., a phenomenon preserved by social relationship pressures in informal work environments. The familial culture that colors industrial relations in the UMKM sector of Temanggung Regency functions as a hidden mechanism of rights repression: workers are reluctant to report, not because they do not know their rights, but because they fear damaging established social relations. Friedman (2009) views this condition as a failure of legal culture that cannot be solved solely through regulatory approaches, but requires long-term, community-based value transformation. Tjandraningsih (2022) adds a critical dimension that the Job Creation Law, which shifts power towards employers, further weakens workers' bargaining position, thereby deepening their unwillingness to use available complaint mechanisms.

Convergence of Three Dimensions: Implications for Policy Reform

Synthesized, the three research variables do not operate independently but interact to form an effectiveness trap that locks in. Limited resources reduce inspection frequency; minimal inspections weaken deterrence and norm enforcement; weak enforcement reinforces the perception that violations are normal; and this normalization of violations further pushes legal culture toward greater permissiveness. Hidayat and Setiawan (2022) recommend that, in contexts where informal MSMMs dominate, a supervisory approach based on mentoring and education is more effective than punitive approaches alone. Therefore, redesigning the labor supervision system in Temanggung Regency requires an integrated strategy that simultaneously strengthens the structural capacity of inspectors, rebuilds cross-tier government communication networks, and invests in sustainable community-based labor law literacy programs (Nugroho, 2018; Purwanto & Sulistyastuti, 2017).

6. Conclusions

This study has produced a comprehensive empirical mapping of the effectiveness of labor supervision in Temanggung Regency following the implementation of Law No. 6 of 2023 on Job Creation. Based on descriptive and correlational analyses of four research variables, several key conclusions can be drawn.

First, the overall effectiveness of labor supervision in Temanggung Regency is in the low category (mean = 2.37). All indicators of this variable, from compliance with wage payments in accordance with the prevailing minimum wage (UMK), BPJS Ketenagakerjaan participation, the frequency and reach of field inspections, to the rate of settlement of cases of norm violations, show conditions that are not satisfactory. This finding confirms that the centralization of supervisory authority to the provincial level mandated by the Job Creation Law has created a vacuum of authority at the district level, significantly weakening workers' normative protection, especially in the informal SME sector.

Second, supervisory resources prove to have the strongest positive relationship with the effectiveness of labor supervision ($r = 0.672$; sig. 0.000). Limitations in the number of inspectors, operational budgets, and inspection facilities and infrastructure are the most dominant structural obstacles that directly limit the reach and intensity of labor supervision in the district area. Institutional reforms that are not accompanied by a proportional increase in resources are counterproductive to the goal of increasing worker protection.

Third, labor law culture ranks second in correlation strength ($r = 0.638$; sig. = 0.000) and has the lowest mean (2.46). Low business legal awareness, workers' lack of courage to file complaints, and weak trust in the legal system form persistent cultural barriers that cannot be overcome solely through formal law enforcement approaches. Transforming the legal culture requires long-term strategies that are educational, participatory, and community-based.

Fourth, policy communication has a moderate yet significant positive relationship with supervision effectiveness ($r = 0.584$; sig. 0.000). Institutional fragmentation due to centralization has disrupted the vertical communication chain between the provincial and district governments, so labor policies are not effectively communicated to all business actors and workers at the local level.

Based on these findings, this study recommends three integrative policy agendas: first, increasing the quota of labor inspectors specially assigned to districts with high informal SME characteristics, along with increasing the operational inspection budget; second, developing a cross-level policy communication system structured between the Jawa Tengah Province Manpower Office and Temanggung Regency government as a compensatory coordination mechanism post-centralization; and third, launching a community-based labor law literacy program involving local leaders, workers' organizations, and SME employers associations on a sustainable basis. These three agendas should be implemented simultaneously and in an integrated manner to break the effectiveness trap that has long hampered labor supervision in Temanggung Regency.

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